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New policy actions on environmental impact, industry responsibility, and new nicotine products took center stage at COP11. Photo credit: WHO.
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Leaders from the WHO FCTC Secretariat warned that illicit tobacco poses a worldwide risk to both public health and government tax revenues. Photo credit: WHO.
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FCTC MOP4 press conference. MOP4 outcome includes working groups on key manufacturing inputs and assistance and cooperation, and a mandate for the Secretariat, UNOODC, and WCO to map global seizure data to improve enforcement. Parties also backed higher licensing fees to fund monitoring and enforcement.
It won’t be back for two years. COP11 concluded in Geneva, where 160 parties agreed to a set of new regulatory measures addressing environmental harm, industry liability, and the regulation of novel nicotine products. MOP4, however, was far more interesting. MOP officials urged greater commitment to combating illicit tobacco, greater involvement from the criminal justice system, expanded enforcement coordination, and stricter operational controls over the tobacco and nicotine supply chain.
The 11th Conference of Parties (COP11) to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the 4th session of the Meeting of Parties (MOP4) to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products are often held consecutively, with 2025’s MOP4 immediately following COP11 to discuss illicit trade. The biggest news from COP11 was an immediate, strict prohibition on all novel nicotine products (such as e-cigarettes and nicotine pouches) at all indoor and outdoor UN premises worldwide.
MOP4 took place two days after COP11 concluded, and that meeting advanced some of the most significant positions in treaty history. During the official closing briefing of the biennial MOP4, Secretariat leaders described illicit tobacco as a global threat to public health and tax systems, emphasizing the need for governments to increase prosecution and cross-border investigative efforts.
Andrew Black, acting head of the WHO FCTC Secretariat, opened the briefing by calling illicit trade “not a victimless crime,” noting that it fuels money laundering, corruption, and organized crime, and that it costs governments tax revenue. He reiterated the Secretariat’s estimate that eliminating illicit tobacco could yield more than US$47 billion in annual savings worldwide.
Independent economists note that such global estimates vary with assumptions about baseline volumes and enforcement effectiveness, and that they do not account for shifting consumer behavior or the dynamics of unregulated nicotine markets.
Black highlights new decisions made at MOP4, including the formation of a Working Group on Article 6.5 to review controls on key manufacturing inputs; a Working Group on Article 24 focused on assistance and cooperation; and a mandate for the Secretariat, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to map global seizure data to help standardize enforcement approaches.
Parties also adopted guidance to increase the collection of licensing fees to fund monitoring and enforcement. During the briefing, Black announced that the island nation of Vanuatu had joined the protocol, raising the total membership to 71 Parties.
MOP president Dr. Mansour Zafer Al Kathiri reported that over 800 delegates participated and that 80% of Parties reported adherence to Article 5.3—WHO FCTC rules limiting industry engagement. He called MOP4 a chance for parties “to recommit themselves to eliminating illicit trade,” noting decisions on licensing, seizure, information sharing, prosecution, and manufacturing inputs.
He expressed gratitude to the observers and non-party states for attending and was optimistic that more countries would join.
Throughout the week, WHO FCTC speakers described illicit trade as increasingly sophisticated and closely linked to organized crime. However, journalists questioned the Secretariat on whether this portrayal aligns with regional enforcement realities, noting that many studies of illicit markets show significant variation across borders, tax differences, and local enforcement capabilities.
Black argued that the rise in global cigarette seizures indicates improved detection rather than growth in illicit markets, a point some analysts dispute because seizure data does not necessarily reflect actual consumption.
Global enforcement pressure
The high-level MOP4 session brought together cross-border enforcement agencies, prosecutors, researchers, and investigative journalists to discuss the illicit tobacco trade.
Interpol’s director of strategic partnerships, Dr. Ying Wu, told attendees that illicit tobacco is increasingly linked to broader “poly-crime” operations—such as drug trafficking, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, money laundering, and corruption—and that criminal groups readily shift among commodities, using the same routes, logistics, and clandestine supply chains.
She warned that enforcement gaps, under-regulated free-trade zones, and jurisdictional blind spots enable illegal flows to flourish. Interpol highlighted operations in South America and international efforts, including Operation Pangea, which recently seized counterfeit vaping products contaminated with harmful substances, sold online and shipped through cross-border courier networks.
Prosecutors from Gabon and Latvia described national challenges rooted in porous borders, corruption, resource constraints, and the difficulty of proving individual criminal intent in smuggling cases. Gabonese prosecutor Perrine Ada Obiang detailed reliance on unofficial river crossings, limited scanning capacity, and complex supply chains originating in Cameroon and Nigeria.
Latvian prosecutor Lakita Sinkiewicz highlighted cases involving hidden compartments in semi-trailers and stressed that many illegal trade prosecutions in Europe are increasingly related to e-cigarettes and vaping products, which Latvia bans from online sales to prevent unregulated imports targeting minors. She pointed out that many illegal vaping product sellers operate from abroad, making enforcement more difficult.
Civil-society organizations and investigative journalists raised broader structural critiques of global enforcement. Andrei Ciurcanu of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) said investigators “often find smugglers and companies working hand in hand,” but only in environments where authorities are either corrupt or overwhelmed.
He argued that many agencies “do not see the big picture,” focusing on individual seizures while overlooking transnational networks. OCCRP reporting has documented cases in which illicit flows exploited weak data sharing between countries, fragmented investigations, and failures to thoroughly examine corporate devices or communications.
OCCRP editor Alessia Cerantola said journalists’ cross-border networks have uncovered instances in which illicit cigarette volumes were allegedly used by companies to pressure governments into lowering excise taxes—a tactic intended to frame tax increases as the cause of illicit trade, even in markets where independent data shows that organized crime and regulatory gaps are more significant drivers.
She noted that some brands have appeared in illegal channels before being officially registered with customs, raising questions about the relationship between supply-chain diversion and regulatory approval processes, though no evidence was presented. She also cited cases in which ministries of health or customs authorities delayed or suppressed reports on illegal trade patterns, underscoring internal political tensions.
Tuesday Reitano of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime said illicit tobacco should be prioritized in organized crime strategies rather than treated as a secondary fiscal concern. She argued that criminal groups operate most effectively in areas with weak beneficial-ownership rules, in free-trade zones with limited oversight, and in under-regulated corporate registration systems.
She urged parties to harmonize penalties across jurisdictions, warning that criminal networks “always migrate to the path of least resistance.”
During the final press conference, Secretariat officials emphasized that the protocol already includes “sustainability mechanisms,” such as licensing fees and manufacturer-funded track-and-trace systems. However, several countries noted informally that advanced enforcement systems remain costly and technically challenging.
The Secretariat replied that implementing the protocol should be viewed as “an investment,” reiterating earlier comments on tax-revenue benefits. Independent studies, however, consistently show that tax recovery varies widely depending on governance effectiveness, border security, and the extent of illicit manufacturing.
What comes next
COP 11 brought very few policy changes. The biggest news from COP11 was the approval of a binding decision banning the use and sale of all tobacco and nicotine products, including nicotine pouches, on all United Nations indoor and outdoor premises worldwide. Parties also adopted measures to reduce environmental damage caused by tobacco products (Article 18), including potential bans on cigarette filters, and to strengthen legal, civil, and criminal liability for the tobacco industry (Article 19).
During COP11, parties discussed future-oriented “endgame” measures under Article 2.1, including proposals to fully ban nicotine products. Delegates described the measure as a governance and workplace health decision, though industry analysts expect it to affect procurement policies and institutional norms beyond the UN system.
The developments appear to create a unified enforcement approach that emphasizes the criminal justice system, limits industry-government interactions, and strengthens the role of international policing bodies in nicotine-product policy. For years, major tobacco and nicotine industry stakeholders have called for stricter enforcement against illicit tobacco products. MOP4 confirmed that the Protocol’s implementation focuses on expanding enforcement, controlling upstream supply chains, and bolstering anti-illicit-trade efforts as part of broader anti-corruption initiatives.
However, questions remain. Independent analyses consistently show that illicit-market patterns depend on a complex interplay of tax differences, border security, retail economics, online distribution, corruption, and consumer substitution—not merely the presence of regulated nicotine products. Investigative reports have uncovered both industry-linked and non-industry criminal supply chains, indicating that no single actor controls illicit markets universally.
Even within the EU, where tracking systems are advanced, illegal trade varies widely across countries due to cross-border price differences and enforcement capabilities. Still, the Secretariat’s message to governments remained clear.
“The protocol gives us the tools,” Black said. “Let us use them boldly, effectively, and comprehensively.” Whether governments can turn those tools into balanced, evidence-based enforcement—while recognizing the limitations of seizure data and the variety of drivers of illicit trade—remains the key question as the Protocol advances to its next stage.
With COP11 entering the planning stages for 2027’s COP12 and MOP4’s decisions set in motion, the nicotine and tobacco industries hope that the remainder of 2026 brings a more aggressive, enforcement-focused global regulatory environment than at any time since FCTC entered into force. They’re hopeful but not convinced.
The 12th Conference of Parties (COP12) and the 5th session of the Meeting of Parties (MOP5) are scheduled to be held in 2027 in Yerevan, Armenia.